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For three decades following the end of World
War II, American refugee "policy" was a collage of ad
hoc programs responding to the compelling needs of
displaced, homeless, or politically oppressed persons.
The Refugee Act of 1980 was enacted to create order
out of the legislative chaos. The Act established a
systematic procedure for determining the number of
refugees to be admitted each year, and brought
United States law into conformity with the Geneva
Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. Drafted from the perspective of the United
States as a country of "second asylum," the Act contemplated the orderly selection of persons overseas.
Almost as an afterthought, the legislators added
a section to the Act that, for the first time, established a statutory basis for the granting of asylum to
aliens in the United States. Under the new provision,
section 208 of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA), the Attorney General may grant asylum to an
alien "physically present in the United States or at
a land border or port of entry" if the Attorney
General determines that the alien meets the statute's
definition of "refugee" -that is, a person who has
a well-founded fear that, if returned home, he or she
will be persecuted on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a social group, or political
opinion.
·
It was not anticipated that a great number of aliens
would apply for asylum under the new section. Only
a few thousand aliens a year had sought asylum in
previous years under procedures established by
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) regulations. In the few years since passage of the Refugee
Act, however, more than 120,000 asylum applications
have been filed; and the vast majority are still pending before administrative authorities. Asylum has
thus appropiately been described (by Professor David
Martin) as the "wild card in the immigration deck."
This extraordinary increase in the number of pending asylum claims is cause for concern. First, such
an increase may seriously tax procedures established
for a far smaller flow . The overburdening of the proc-

ess may result in substantial delays and proceedings
that threaten the accuracy of the determinations .
Second, the dramatic increase may indicate that the
process is being used (or abused) by aliens who file
frivolous claims to forestall return to their home
countries. The high rate of denials, asserts the government, substantiates the view that many applicants
are "economic migrants," not refugees. Adjudicating
frivolous claims takes time and money and causes
delays which actually may spark the filing of additional claims .
Advocates of asylum applicants contest the government's view. Their criticisms represent a
third concern about the present system: the accuracy
and fairness of the decision-making process. The
critics maintain that the government, by labeling certain classes of aliens "economic migrants," has
essentially prejudged the validity of their applications
and that the prejudgment is a product of political
considerations that look more to the foreign policy
objectives of the United States than to the merits of
the particular application. They further object to proposals to reduce procedural protections for asylum
applicants.
The recent flood of asylum claims, and the concerns
it engenders, are not peculiar to the United States.
Western Euorpean nations such as France and the
Federal Republic of Germany have witnessed similar
increases in asylum applications over the past decade,
and institutions charged with adjudicating claims
have become severely overburdened. French and West
German officials believe that aliens with "frivolous"
claims of persecution are "abusing" the asylum process in order to circumvent strict restrictions on the
immigration of workers . West Germany has recently
enacted major changes in its asylum procedures and
has adopted far tougher policies regarding benefits
available to applicants. France may be on the brink of
doing so. To appreciate whether the German and
French experiences are salient to the American situation, it is first necessary to review in greater detail
the asylum process in this country.
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· ~"---The number of asylum claims filed in INS district
offices, as reported by the INS, is indicated in the
accompanying table. Each year, case filings have substantially exceeded case closings; and there are
presently pending before the INS probably about
160,000 cases . To some extent this is a misleading figure, because it includes approximately 120,000 cases
that the government does not intend to adjudicateprimarily undocumented Cubans and Haitians who
are likely to be given lawful status under legislation
presently pending before Congress. Although this
fact undercuts the dire picture usually painted by the
executive and legislative branches of government, a
backlog of over 40 ,000 cases before the INS cannot be
dismissed as insignificant. Moreover, a substantial
number of new claims arrive each month, and it is
likely that thousands of additional claims could surface if INS enforcement activities inside the United
States were stepped up.

The large increase in asylum claims would not necessarily be cause for alarm if adequate procedures
existed to adjudicate them. Unfortunately, this is not
the case.
Formally, asylum claims are filed either with an
INS district office or, if the alien is subject to an
exclusion or deportation hearing, with an immigration judge. In the district office, the alien is usually
called in for an interview; if the claim is made to an
immigration judge, the alien is entitled to a hearing.
The alien's application is sent by the district office
or the immigration judge to the State Department's
Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs
for an "advisory opinion" on the conditions in the
alien's homeland. If the district office d.enies an application for asylum, there is no administrative review;
the alien may, however, reassert the claim before
an immigration judge in a subsequent exclusion or
deportation hearing. A denial by an immigration
judge may be appealed to the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) and to a federal court.
1. Delay-This structure raises obvious opportunities for delay, and administrative practices virtually
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ensure it. Claims filed with district offices are not
handled in a uniform or centralized manner. Some
offices have thousands of claims while others have
only a few. Within the district offices, asylum claims
are viewed as difficult, unrewarding cases and are
often assigned to junior INS officers. Until recently,
the bureaucracy put no special emphasis on processing asylum claims, and simply left thousands of
claims at the bottom of the work pile. Aliens and
their lawyers often put no pressure on officials to
process claims, particularly where claims are filed primarily to forestall deportation. An INS study
estimates that 40 to 80 percent of the applicants do
not appear for scheduled interviews. It attributes the
high no-show rate to the alien's desire, in some
cases, not to be located, and the INS's failure to process change of address forms.
Recent efforts by the INS have made some headway in clearing the backlog out of district offices. But
this has merely shifted some of the burden up the
decision-making chain to the 55 immigration judges.
New filings before immigration judges are averaging
between 300 and 500 a month, and only one case is
adjudicated for every two filed. The best estimate
of the total number of asylum cases presently before
immigration judges is between 8,000 and 10,000.
When one adds to these cases the more than 100 ,000
deportation and exclusion cases filed before immigration judges in fiscal year 1983, it is apparent that
many pending asylum claims will not be adjudicated
for quite some time. Further delay, of couq;e, will
be occasioned by review of the immigration judges'
decisions at the BIA and in the courts.
The current procedural and practical delays are
troubling for several reasons. First, the delay caused
by multiple levels of review is costly, and asylum
proceedings take time and resources from other
immigration and judicial work. We may be willing to
bear this cost for humanitarian reasons; but it is clear
that the total cost of the current process is not one
that Congress consciously opted for when it passed
the Refugee Act.
Second, the crush of applications and ensuing
delay may lead administrative agencies to adopt programs that sacrifice fair adjudication for an expedited
processing of claims. This in fact occurred in 1978
when the INS decided it was time to clear up a backlog of Haitian claims that had accumulated over
several years . The result was disastrous. Haitians
were run through a process that was grossly unfair
and one that, ironically, left the government no better
off than it had been before the program: a federal
court, appalled at the conduct, ordered the government to adjudicate the claims again.

Finally, the long delays now expotentially enormous: lawful perASYLUM CLAIMS
manent residence in the United
tant in the process may spark the
FILED IN INS DISTRICT
filing of additional claims. Obvious
OFFICES, 1978-1984
States.
Other factors also undercut the
incentives are created if aliens know
Fiscal Year
Number
that they will not be deported ungovernment's
claim that the
3,702
1978
til all avenues of review are exincrease in applications is primar5,801
1979
hausted. This potential reward to
ily a product of abuse of the
1980
15,955
system. First, a large number of
an alien with a frivolous asylum
61,568
1981
claim may quickly lead to a vicious
the claims in the current backlog
circle: the greater the number of
were filed by aliens advised to do
33,246
1982
frivolous claims, the greater the
so by the INS. Second, several law26,091
1983
suits have halted the adjudication
backlog; the greater the backlog,
13,419
Oct. 1983-Mar. 1984
the greater the delay in adjudicaof claims. This in turn has inflated
the number of pending claims and
tions; the greater the delay, the
has contributed to the perception
greater the incentive to file frivthat the system is being overolous claims.
whelmed by frivolous claims . Finally, increased worldWhether such a vicious circle now exists is a matter
of dispute. The g.overnment has asserted that much
wide concern with human rights issues and the pasof the huge increase in filings is due to abuse of the
sage of the Refugee Act may have made aliens (and
system by "economic migrants" who take advantage
their lawyers) more aware of the possibility of being
of the current delays to further their stay in the
granted asylum.
·
United States. Without specific empirical evidence
2. The appearance of political intervention-As noted
(which, to my knowledge, does not yet exist), it is
above, INS district offices or immigration judges fordifficult to evaluate this claim. However, several facward asylum claims to the State Department's Bureau
tors cast doubt upon the government's position.
on Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs
First is the fact that the vast bulk of pending claims
(BHRHA) for an "advisory" opinion on the merits of .
are filed by aliens from countries where persecution
the claim. Most INS district officials and immigration
is a realistic possibility. Over 90 percent of the claims
judges have neither the information, experience, nor
involve aliens from Cuba, Iran, El Salvador, Nicaratraining to evaluate allegations regarding political
gua, Poland, Afghanistan, the People's Republic of
conditions in the alien's home country. A study of
China, Ethiopia, Haiti, Iraq, and Lebanon. These,
the asylum process in New York found "a certain
excepting El Salvador, are not the primary countries
discomfort
with asylum cases" among the immigraof origin of undocumented workers in the United
tion judges:
States. Of course, these data do not disprove that
many of those who have filed claims are "economic
They understand they will be making possible life-ormigrants." It is possible that aliens use the asylum
death decisions on the basis of subjective impressions
process as a delaying tactic only if their home counand with minimum evidence. Several noted the presence
tries are within the category of those from which
of political factors and pressures in asylum cases, especlaims have been accepted in the past. It is not
cially with regard to the larger, more controversial
obvious, however, why aliens bent on holding off
groups, e.g. Salvadorans, Haitians, and Poles. None
would elaborate on the nature of these political factors,
their departure would not take advantage of the genand all asserted their independence of judgment, but
eral delay involved in processing all asylum claims.
some did express the feeling that they were being
The United States has no procedure for a quick and
obliged to make judicial decisions which were more
final denial of even a patently frivolous application. A
properly made in the political arena, and on political
claim from Canada is entitled to the same procedures
grounds. For the immigration judges, as for the examina(and delays) as one from Kampuchea.
tions officers, political judgments are seen as the domain
Rather than pointing to "economic migrants" as the
of the Department of State. Judges do not dispute State
primary source of increased asylum claims, these
Department country expertise, even if they may differ
considerations suggest that the increase is due in part
with advisory opinion letters on specific cases.
(perhaps even in large part) to aliens who have some
It is thus not surprising that in almost every case the
reason to fear returning to their home countries. The
State Department's advice is deemed conclusive.
cost to an alien of applying for asylum is negligible
This situation is disturbing. First, the alien is not
(indeed, the alien benefits in the short term by
able to make her case to the State Department nor is
remaining in this country), and the long-term gain is
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she able to question State Department sources. In
effect, the main event in an asylum proceeding occurs
wholly outside the hearing. Equally troubling is the
internal procedure of the State Department. Assistant
Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian
Affairs, Elliot Abrams, has described it as follows:
Each application is reviewed individually by an officer
in the Office of Asylum Affairs of [BHRHA] and then is
sent to the appropriate country desk officer in the
Department. If appropriate, [BHRHA] may request an
opinion from the Office of the Legal Adviser or information from the U.S. Embassy in the applicant's country
of nationality, or, if appropriate, in a third country. After
agreement is reached between the asylum officer in [BHRHA]
and the desk officer on the proposed recommendation to
INS, the draft advisory opinion and application file are
reviewed by the Director of the Office of Asylum Affairs
in [BHRHA], and in some cases by the geographic officer
in [BHRHA] or by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Asylum and Humanitarian Affairs. It is rare for individual cases to rise to more senior levels. The proposed
recommendation then is signed by the Director of the
Office of Asylum Affairs and sent to INS. (Emphasis
added.)

The presentation of every asylum case to the country
desk allows the intrusion of political factors into asylum decisions since country desk officers may have
strong views about the effect that recognizing or not
recognizing claims could have on the achievement
of American foreign policy objectives. Again, there
has been no empirical test of this proposition, but the
data seem to create at least an appearance of political
distortion: aliens seeking asylum from countries
friendly to the United States are less likely to be
granted asylum than those from countries unfriendly
to the United States. Other explanations may also
be consistent with these figures; yet the appearance
of disparate treatment lingers and is supported by
other circumstantial evidence.

~~&Ul\Abd~
~ltttJ(gt1j~~~am~In France and West Germany, as in the United
States, world events, improved transportation and
communication, generous asylum policies, high standards of living, and limits on legal immigration have
produced a huge rise in the number of asylum
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claims. The rapid increases have overwhelmed existing adjudicatory institutions, causing long delays
which themselves may well have stimulated more
filings.
The responses of the three countries, which have
varied considerably, have been directed at two aims:
expediting the adjudication of claims and deterring
the filing of new claims. Germany has moved vigorously on both fronts. It has enacted measures that
streamline the adjudication process by bringing more
judges into the process and restricting appeals. To
deter the filing of claims, Germany has cut benefits,
restricted work authorization, required visas and
instituted communal housing arrangements for asylum applicants. These new policies have dramatically
reduced the number of asylum claims filed. France,
so far, has hardly altered its adjudication process and
has done little to deter the filing of claims.
The United States, under the Reagan Administration, has focused primarily on programs designed to
deter additional asylum claims. 1 These measures have
been part of a broader initiative to "regain control of
our borders." In the summer of 1981, the INS instituted a new policy of detaining aliens who arrive
at the border without documentation or a colorable
right to enter. The government also sought to stop the
flow of Haitian boat people into southern Florida.
President Reagan issued an Executive Order authorizing the Coast Guard to stop and return vessels
believed to be transporting aliens to the United States
in violation of the immigration laws. By exchange of
notes, the government also entered into an agreement
with Haiti that permits American authorities to
return ships to Haiti in order to enforce "appropriate
Haitian laws." Under this interdiction program, the
United States has stopped and returned to Haiti some
56 vessels carrying 1,367 Haitians. Furthermore, the
government adopted a regulation restricting opportunities for asylum applicants to work pending
adjudication of their claims. Under the new rule, an
INS district director may grant employment authorization only upon a determination that the asylum
claim is "non-frivolous ."
Legal actions have stymied some of these deterrent
measures. A federal district court invalidated the
detention policy; and a panel of the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed, holding that the policy had been promulgated in violation of the Administrative Procedure
Act and applied to Haitian applicants in a discriminatory manner. Although the panel's decision was
recently overturned on other grounds by the Eleventh
Circuit sitting en bane, most of the Haitian detainees
had been released by order of the district court. In
the Southwest, two lawsuits have successfully challenged border patrol practices that persuaded

Salvadorans to leave the United States without filing
asylum claims. An action brought by a Haitian refugee group in the United States challenging the
legality of the interdiction program was dismissed for
lack of standing-although the government has never
asserted a satisfactory moral or legal basis for the
policy. 2
The second goal-expedition of asylum adjudications-has been the subject of several governmental
initiatives. Legislation supported by the administration and passed twice by the Senate would assign
asylum claims to administrative law judges trained in
refugee and international law, and would limit
opportunities for judicial review. The government has
also taken part in a program to train members of the
bar to handle asylum cases and has made action on
asylum claims a priority in INS district offices and at
the State Department.
The deterrent and procedural measures adopted to
date have not been as successful as the German programs in stemming the influx of asylum seekers. The
number of applicants from Haiti-while never a substantial portion of the total number of claimantshas dropped to a trickle under the interdiction program. But increases from other countries have kept
the backlog of asylum claims steadily rising. Furthermore, although greater devotion of resources has
begun to reduce the backlogs in INS offices, over
40,000 claims (not including Cuban applications)
remain to be adjudicated. Some 8,000 to 10,000 additional applications are pending before immigration
judges, and two cases are being docketed for every
one decided.
It is clear that additional proposals for change are
necessary. Such proposals must begin with identification and exploration of the fundamental goals of
asylum policy.

At the foundation of American asylum policy is our
legal and moral obligation not to return persons to
countries in which there is a reasonable likelihood
that they will be persecuted. It is important to notice
what this statement does not say. First, it does not
require the United States to grant asylum- effectively, permanent resident status- to all aliens who
come within the definition of "refugee" ; it simply
prohibits the return of a bona fide refugee (nonrefoulement) . This distinction is important because we
may wish to limit the number of aliens to whom we
grant asylum in light of broader immigration d ecisions regarding the number of aliens the nation is

prepared to absorb each year.3 Such a decision may
not violate legal or moral norms if we can find other
nations that would welcome aliens eligible for asylum. Second, the mere statement of the principle
of non-return says nothing about the obvious tradeoff between the cost of adjudicating claims and the
degree of certainty of our decisions on the merits of
claims. Concern about the terrible consequences of
wrongly denying asylum may argue in favor of the
fullest kind of investigation of claims. But arriving at
certainty about the likelihood of persecution could
be an extraordinarily expensive enterprise (assuming
such certainty is attainable at all). The alternatives,
however, are no less troublesome: tolerating a lower
level of certainty in decision making may either spark
the filing of marginal claims (if the standard of proof
is too lenient) or may run the risk of violating our
obligation not to return refugees (if the standard of
proof is too strict). Taking these factors into consideration, a more refined statement of the basic American
goal may be to devise a set of policies and procedures

that identify, with an acceptable degree of certainty, an
acceptable number of aliens who are likely to be persecuted if returned home, provided that the policies and
procedures do not stimulate the filing of a large number
of non-bona fide claims that threaten both the accuracy
of decisions and public support for the program as a
whole.
If this is an accurate statement of what the American goal should be, then the present system falls
alarmingly short of achieving it. A critical observer of
current policies and institutions would be led to conclude that we are pursuing two rather different goals:
first, the deterrence of all asylum claims from aliens
whose countries of origin are friendly to the United
States (particularly Haiti and El Salvador); and second, effective control of decisions by the State
Department, which can inject political considerations
into the process in the guise of aiding inefficient and
undertrained immigration officials. In beginning to
rethink how American practices and institutions
ought to be restructured, there are several lessons that
can be drawn from the German and French
experiences.

Should the United States adopt measures aimed
primarily at reducing the number of asylum claims?
What is troubling about such a strategy is that aliens
with bona fide claims m ay be deterred or prevented
from applying and perhaps returned to likely persecution. The challenge, therefore, is to develop a set of
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policies that creates burdens or disincentives great
enough to deter frivolous claims but not so great as
to deter bona fide claimants from applying. This
appears to be the central aim of the new West German policies. As stated openly by the German
Ministry of the Interior: "The sole objective of the
[recent] measures taken ... has been, and still is, to
remove the incentives for those foreigners who are
not politically persecuted to enter [West Germany]
illegally for economic reasons by abusing the rights of
asylum."
Not surprisingly, advocates of asylum seekers
attack the West German strategy as overbroad. They
assert that the visa requirement and housing program
prevent true refugees from getting to Germany and
cause bona fide claimants in Germany to abandon
good claims or seek protection in another country.
The response of the government is, in effect, that
aliens will get to Germany and tolerate current policies if they have legitimate fears of persecution.
The obvious problem we face in fairly evaluating
the German strategy-or any other similar set of policies-is our extraordinary lack of information
regarding the motivations and actions of asylum
seekers. In such a vacuum, a policy of deterrence
runs a serious risk of incorrect calibrations that produce dire consequences.
The interdiction and detention policies in the
United States, at least as they are directed against
Haitians and Salvadorans, give no guarantee of deterring only frivolous claims. Could the United States
do better by adopting the German deterrent policies?
It is quite doubtful. First, this country already has
two of the German measures in place: aliens need
visas to enter the United States, and work authorization is only granted for asylum applicants with "nonfrivolous" claims. These policies seek to deter asylum
applications by preventing aliens from getting to the
United States or by making this country a less attractive country in which to reside. Given a porous
border and a healthy demand for undocumented
workers, however, neither measure effectively deters
unlawful entry. Thus aliens with frivolous claims still
are likely to be able to enter and reside in the United
States.
The German communal housing program, which
requires asylum applicants to live in group facilities,
could prove expensive to administer and would likely
be ineffective. (Short-term detention in communal
housing might be a reasonable policy, however, for
aliens applying for asylum at the border. It would let
them know that an asylum claim is not automatically
a ticket for entry and residence in the United States.
It should be stressed, however, that the current
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American policy goes far beyond the German housing program. Whatever deterrence the German policy
brings about, long-term imprisonment-which too
many asylum seekers in this country have sufferedruns a real risk of being inhumane and causing aliens
to abandon legitimate claims.)
These considerations suggest that efforts to deter
the filing of mala fide claims must proceed along two
fronts. The first is improved border control and shortterm detention of aliens at the border who present
patently frivolous claims for asylum. The second is
expedition of the adjudication of claims (without sacrificing accuracy). Expedition will diminish incentives
to file a claim that merely seeks to gain an alien time
and also will make acceptable a policy of detention
at the border.

Development of a fair and expeditious process
would have a substantial deterrent effect on frivolous
claimants: would-be migrants in their home countries
would see earlier voyagers who were stopped at the
border returning home after only a short stay in the
.• United States. An expedited process would also mean
that filing an asylum claim would no longer be a way
to put off deportation for a considerable period of
time. Equally important, a reformed asylum adjudication process would restore confidence that the system
is not being manipulated for political purposes and
could obviate the need for intrusive judicial intervention, which has severely slowed the process. If we
are willing to seriously reformulate the way asylum
claims are adjudicated in the United States, the West
German and French systems provide some extremely
interesting possibilities.

1. The need for an independent federal agency to adjudicate asylum claims - Foremost is the need for the
United States to create an independent federal agency
to adjudicate asylum claims. As described in Part I,
an alien may apply for asylum to an INS official or an
immigration judge. Adjudicating asylum claims may
be a small portion of these officials' duties. Moreover,
few have specialized training in international law or
refugee matters; they therefore almost universally rely
upon "advice" received from the State Department.
The involvement of the State Department creates
opportunities for political considerations to affect
decisions on the merits of the claim and adds another
layer to the process.

The adjudication systems in West Germany and
France suggest an alternative for the United States.
Both countries have a centralized federal agency
whose only mission is to adjudicate asylum claims.
The existence of such an institution fosters the development of expertise and knowledge, the evenhanded
application of rules and policies, and far less reliance
upon the foreign ministries for information and
advice. In both countries, decision makers can concentrate on particular countries and become
thoroughly familiar with conditions, events, political
parties, and social groups in those countries. This
kind of expertise significantly improves the ability of
the decision makers to judge the credibility of the
applicant.
Adoption of this model in the United States could
help ensure a similar expertise in decision making.
Furthermore, the centralization of asylum adjudications would also end the present maldistribution
of asylum claims among INS districts. It would also
facilitate the creation of a library and documentation
center which could be available to both decision
makers and °lawyers. Obviously some logistical problems would occur. But both Germany and France
have recently opened up a few suboffices in other
cities. That model could be adopted here, or adjudicators could conceivably "ride circuit."
The establishment of an independent agency to
adjudicate asylum claims would have the additional
salutary effect of decreasing the likelihood of court
intervention in the processing of claims. Under the
current system, courts have ordered intrusive injunctive relief when faced with evidence of massive
violations of due process. The adjudication of Haitian
asylum claims, for example, has been tied up by
courts for nearly a decade. Independent agency adjudication of asylum claims would help alleviate this
problem; courts would have increased confidence in
the fairness and accuracy of decisions reached by
an agency operating with a corps of professional,
well-trained adjudicators who are removed from the
enforcement side of the immigration system.
2. The independence of the federal agency and the
removal of the advisory role of the State_Department-A
serious problem with the present American asylum
system is the widely shared perception that it is
politically biased. The German and French experiences demonstrate that no governmental agency is
fully immune from political pressures. But the general
perception in both countries is that the federal asylum agencies are largely free from political influence.
No such perception exists in the United States. The
relative ease with which Eastern Europeans and

·. . : .

·. . .:

Cubans have been granted asylum as opposed to the
extremely low recognition rates for Haitians and Salvadorans casts a long shadow on the proclaimed
neutrality of the system. A major purpose of the Refugee Act of 1980 was to remove the political and
ideological aspects of American refugee law, but
many persons involved in the process are not convinced that this has occurred. Establishment of an
agency outside the Department of Justice and not
dependent upon the State Department would help
eliminate the appearance of, and potential for, political influence in the asylum process. The agency could
be run by a board of directors appointed for lengthy,
staggered terms by the president with advice and
consent from the Senate. The board would be responsible for selecting an executive director who would
hire qualified adjudicators and other staff. The
agency's independence could be further demonstrated
by following Germany's example of permitting the
UNHCR to have a permanent observer at the agency.
Crucial to the independence of the agency would
be the termination of the State Department's "advisory" role. Officials in both the French and West
German agencies openly talked about the problems of
crediting information and advice from foreign service
officers and ambassadors who have diplomatic roles
to perform. The centralized, single-mission nature of
both agencies has permitted each to develop sufficient expertise to make reliance upon the respective
foreign ministry unnecessary.
Obviously, it would be a mistake to deny the State
Department any role in the asylum process. It is perhaps the best source of information on conditions
in other countries, and both the French and German
agencies often seek information from their foreign
ministries. But the independent asylum agency
should use information from other sources as well,
such as newspapers, Amnesty International, academics, and expert witnesses. In no case should the State
Department be asked to render an opinion on
whether or not the individual is entitled to refugee
status; rather, the State Department should be seen as
precisely what it is: one very good source of information, but not the decision maker.

3. Limiting opportunities of review-The French system has only one real level of judicial review of the
administrative decision (although appeals to the
Conseil d'Etat are technically possible). Germany has
streamlined its judicial process considerably. The
United States, however, has a system that guarantees
multi-level review through several avenues. These
opportunities for judicial review must be limited if
any progress is to be made in speeding up the pro-
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cess. Assuming a new agency is created with the
requisite independence and expertise, judicial review
should be restricted.
At least two models of appellate review are worth
exploring. The first would make decisions of the new
agency reviewable in a federal court of appeals as
part of a petition for review under present law from
an exclusion or deportation order. To avoid holding
the asylum process hostage to the burgeoning dockets
of the federal appellate courts, however, a novel alternative, patterned somewhat after the French system,
might be more advisable: appeals from the federal
agency could go to a special tribunal for asylum
appeals. The membership of the tribunal could
include designated federal judges, distinguished
members of the bar or nonlawyers knowledgeable in
international and refugee affairs, and a representative
of the UNJ1CR. No appeal beyond the tribunal would
be allowed, although habeas corpus would-by
constitutional necessity-be available to challenge the
constitutionality of the proceedings. The tribunal
could also be empowered to dismiss an appeal on the
pleadings if the claim was determined by the agency
to be "clearly without merit."

4. The need to accommodate foreign policy concerns:
presidential granting of "safe haven" -Refugee and
asylum issues are too wrapped up in fundamental
issues of foreign policy and international relations to
permit creation of an adjudication process that is
entirely free of political influence. The creation of an
independent federal agency that excludes the political
branches from any formal voice would be an
improvement, but it is not enough. It would also be
advisable to create forums, quite distinct from the
adjudication process, in which political considerations could legitimately be exercised.
One example of this is the authority of the Laender
(state) governments in Germany to withhold expulsion of persons whose asylum claims have been
denied. This is viewed simply as a political decision,
and one that can be accomplished without putting
pressure on the federal asylum agency to stretch the
definition of "refugee" or to avoid deciding certain
claims.
A similar distinction between adjudication and
politics should be developed in the United States.
Current practices evidence a confusion of adjudicative
and political functions that undermines procedural
credibility and effectiveness. This confusion is best
evidenced in the government's use of "extended voluntary departure." Extended voluntary departure
(EVD)-an inelegant phrase for an administrative
practice supported by questionable statutory authority-is a technique used by the government to keep
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deportable aliens in the United States. Since 1960, the
government has adopted EVD programs for nationals
of 15 different countries. Some programs have lasted
only a few months; others far longer. Presently,
Ugandans, Poles, Ethiopians, and Afghanis benefit
from blanket grants of EVD; they are not sent home
even if found deportable.
The EVD programs have often served as a low visibility means for the accomplishment of American
foreign policy objectives. Thus, Poles have been
granted EVD as part of the United States' response to
Soviet involvement in Poland, even though most of
the Poles do not satisfy the definition of "refugee" in
the INA. The government, however, has refused to
grant EVD to Salvadorans. It has defended its decision on the grounds that "the degree of civil strife
varies greatly in different parts of El Salvador," and
that "a grant of EVD would probably constitute a
magnet inducing members of the beneficiary nationality to enter the United States illegally."
The reasons cited by the government for denial of
EVD to Salvadorans have been assailed as erroneous
and disingenuous. Critics assert that the
government's policy toward Salvadorans in the
United States is part of its economic and military
support for the regime in El Salvador. More importantly, the government's foreign policy objectives are
said to account for the extremely low number of Salvadoran asylum claims that have been granted. Thus,
the overall perception is that purportedly humanitarian programs-asylum and EVD-are being driven
by political considerations. The perception is
strengthened when one appreciates that EVD decisions and asylum adjudications are both joint
decisions of the Departments of Justice and State.
What is needed are different channels that separate
political decisions from the asylum decisions. The
creation of an independent asylum agency would be
an obvious start; but this must be supplemented by
statutory changes in the immigration law that clearly
locate EVD decisions for classes of aliens outside the
asylum process. This could be accomplished by
enacting legislation that expressly authorizes the
president to grant "safe haven" to classes of aliens
when he determines such action to be in the national
interest. (The immigration laws presently give the
president authority to suspend the entry of classes of
aliens if he deems such entry to be detrimental to
the interests of the United States.) A grant of "safe
haven" would be a political decision conferring on
the aliens no entitlement to remain in the United
States beyond the life of the proclamation and should
in no way influence the asylum process. Aliens
afforded such protection should be able to apply for
asylum and have their claims adjudicated. The federal

agency would not simply put all such claims on hold,
as the INS presently does for aliens granted EVD.
This separation of adjudication and political concerns should leave the federal asylum agency more
freedom to carry out its mandate irrespective of the
political objectives of the Administration. It would
thus help eliminate the appearance that the asylum
process is being used simply to further American
foreign policy objectives.

"Better process" cannot guarantee perfect decisions,
clarify underlying legal standards, or stop world
events that create asylum applicants; but it can make
a number of immediate, tangible improvements. In
the search for such improvements, the German and
French experiences offer some suggestions worth
pursuing . ~

Footnotes

The proposals described here pursue a goal familiar
to lawyers and public administrators: better decisions
through a more independent, expert, and centralized
process. The idea (and ideal) that institutions can
be created to apply neutrally a shared conception of
the public interest has been around at least since the
early years of this century. Unfortunately, almost
every part of this fantasy is denied by what we know
about how the real world operates. Independent
agencies may sometimes be "captured" by the interests they are supposed to be regulating; agency
adjudicators may care more about meeting bureaucratic performance standards than deciding cases
correctly; decision makers inhabit a world of values
and political pressures; "the public interest" cannot
be objectively identified or deduced from shared
premises. The recent experience of the reconstituting
of the "independent" Civil Rights Commission shows
how far the real can deviate from the ideal.
What, then, is the value of "better process" in the
asylum context? Perhaps it reduces to nothing more
than the claim that greater expertise and independence are far better than what we have now.
Centralizing the process, upgrading the expertise of
the adjudicators, downplaying the role of the State
Department, and creating a new avenue for political
decisions should go far in removing the primary
causes of concern about the present system. The
French and German models provide some ground for
cautious optimism here.
Yet "better process" will not solve all the problems
facing the current asylum system. The best process in
the world is worthless if it applies substantive legal
standards that are intolerable. Thus, procedural
improvements cannot permit us to ignore questions
regarding the scope and meaning of our substantive
asylum law or blind us to unacceptable policies currently in place.

1. The Carter Administration policy w as largely ad hoc and incoherent.
President Carter initially welcomed the Mariel Cubans w ith " an open
heart and open arms," N .Y. Times, May 6, 1980, at Al, col. l , but
the Justice Department subsequently sought to prosecute over 300 persons who transported the Cubans between Mariel and Florida. (The
indictments were later dismissed on the ground that the defendants'
actions-which included openly presenting the Cubans to immigration
officials upon arrival in the United States- were not condemned by
the antismuggling p rovisions of the immigration laws, INA§ 274,
8 U.S.C. § 1324 (1982). United States v. Zayas-Morales, 685 F.2d 1272
(11th Cir. 1982). Similarly, although the Administration made human
rights a mainstay of its foreign policy, the INS initiated a program
of mass adjudication of Haitian asylum claims that seriously violated the
due process rights of the applicants. Haitian Refugee Center v . Smith,
676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982).
2. The Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice (OLC), in a
memorandum to the Attorney General, asserted tha t both the agreement
w ith Haiti and the immigration laws provid e legal authority for the
interdiction program . Memorandum of Theodore B. Olson, Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to the Attorney Gen er al
(August 11, 1981). It may well be, as the OLC memorandum argues, that
the President has inherent authority to enter into executive agreements
with a foreign nation to aid the enforcement of that country's laws.
But w hat d oes it say about the United States when it acts to enforce the
laws of one of the most repressive regimes in the Western Hemisphere?
Furthermore, such a p olicy would seem to undercut American criticism
of Eastern bloc n ations who have similar laws restrictin g or b urdenin g
the right to emigrate. The second claimed source of au thority- American immigration laws- is quite d oubtful. The OLC memorandum relies
upon 8 U.S.C. § 1182(£) (1982), which au thorizes the Presid ent to suspend the entry of " any class of aliens" into the United States w here
entry "would be detrimental to the interests of the United States." It is
hard to see how this prov ision, w h ich appears aimed at suspending the
entry of otherwise admissible aliens, authorizes the president to order
th e return of alien s stopped on the h igh seas. The Coast Guard's action
essentially permits the executive branch to avoid the procedures established by the INA for determining the admissibility of an alien seeking
en try.
The interdiction program is pernicious. It raises serious questions
abo ut American compliance with the Geneva Con ven tion , pu ts th e
United States in the role of enforcin g the laws of a rep ressive dictator,
and effectively nullifies congressionally mandated p rocedures for en try
decisions. Its clear purpose is to stop asylum applican ts before they
can reach the United States and receive the benefit of counsel in
requesting a status guaranteed by international con ven tion and domestic
law. See Taylor, U.S . Aides Defend In terdiction of Haitians at Sea, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 29, 1981. Because the program occurs on the high seas, there
is no way for courts to review the actions of the Coast Guard. It is time
for Congress to p u t a stop to th is d irty business.
3. A generous asylu m policy also raises issues of equity regard ing overseas
refugees waiting for resettlement. (I am indebted to Michael Teitelbaum
for calling this point to my attention .) If there is a finite number of
refugees the United States is willing to admit each year, then a huge
increase in the number of aliens gran ted asylum m ay affect the willingness of the United States to select refugees from camps overseas. Is it
rational for American policy to reward refugees who can m ake it to the
Un ited States on their own over refugees wh o can not? There is n o
easy answer here.
O ne response is that, given our accession to the Geneva Convention,
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we have little choice but to recognize the claims of bona fide asylum
applicants. But the Geneva Convention only mandates a policy of nonrefoulement (nonreturn), not the granting of a formal residence. A second
response is that our refugee law, as actually implemented, applies a
stricter standard for asylum applicants than for overseas refugees.
Finally, it may well be that any inequity that exists cannot be overcome
until an international approach to asylum is agreed to by the receiving
countries of the world. Under such a strategy, as conceived by Dale F.
Swartz, President of the National Immigration, Refugee and Citizenship
Forum, countries of first asylum would transfer applicants to an international holding center where claims could be adjudicated. Aliens
recognized as. refugees would then be resettled in a country which may
or may not be the country in which the alien first claimed asylum.
This proposal would go a long way toward ameliorating the present
appearance of inequity.
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